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This note addresses some microstructure consequences of the Spanish Stock Exchange 
Reform on measures of systematic risk of daily asset returns. The Reform modified 
the trading system, clearing and settlement procedures among other changes. This 
note focuses on how these events affected systematic risk measures and 
autocorrelations in a sample of selected stocks. After the Reform significant decreases 
in autocorrelations and lower biases in the betas are found, suggesting that the Reform 
had increased market's operational efficiency. However, Banks sector have special 
features which are explained in terms of trade mechanisms. 
1. Introduction 
Research in microstructure analysis has blossomed in the last ten years. Since the 
book by Cohen et al. (1986) there is a growing work in this area, see Modest (1993) 
for a recent review. Microstructure analysis considers the interplay among market 
agents, trading systems and the behavior of security returns when trading is affected 
by frictions, like delays in settlement procedures or transaction costs. 
When the trading mechanisms changes, as has been the case in London's Big Bang in 
1986 or Paris in 1987, one interesting aspect is how the new regimes affect the order 
flow and prices formation. One example is the paper by Pagano and Roell (1990) on 
the Paris Bourse. 
For the Spanish stock market whose Big Bang was in 1989, there are few studies on 
these issues. The work by Urrutia (1990) focused on the volatility and volume effects 
after the change in the market's settlement and trading procedures. He found evidence 
of lower volatility in almost all sectors except the Banking sector whose volatility 
increased, and no clear effects on volume after the refonns. In an extensive analysis 
of the Banking sector, Berges and Soria (1992) found similar results. This note aims 
to extend previous research using the same database but focusing on some 
microstructure consequences of the Spanish Stock Exchange Refonn on measures of 
systematic risk of daily asset returns. The Refonn modified the trading system, clearing 
and settlement procedures among other changes. This note focuses on how these 
measures affected systematic risk measures and autocorrelations in a sample of selected 
stocks. The paper is organized as follows. Market structure is discussed first. Then 
we present data, methodology and results. We address concluding remarks in the 
final section. 
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2. Market Structure 
There are four stock exchanges in Spain; Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Bilbao. 
Madrid is the dominant exchange, accounting for almost 90% of trading activity. At 
the end of 1993 the total market value of equities quoted on the Madrid Stock Exchange 
was about 1 % of World's capitalization. The largest individual sector was Banking 
(24% of the total), followed by Electrical Utilities (21 %), Telecommunications (11 %), 
Oil and Chemicals (10%), Construction (8%), Investments (6%) and Iron & Steel 
(5%). Foreign investors are free to invest in the Spanish securities markets. The market 
is an order driven market, in contrast with other exchanges (NYSE, LSE) which are 
quote driven markets. 
The Spanish Securities Market Act (SSMA) took effect in July 1989 and its main 
points are (among others) as follows. Official Stock Market Agents, previously 
appointed by the Government, were replaced by private Brokers and Dealers. Trading 
mechanism was changed with the introduction of the Computer Assisted Trading 
System (CATS) open from 11:00 am to 5:00 pm and the termination of the traditional 
open outcry trading process l • Brokerage Fees were liberalized. Also the National 
Stock Exchange Commission (CNMV), Spain's version of the US's SEC, was created. 
A new settlement and clearing service was created (NSL) and was operational at the 
same time that CATS; cash balances are cleared in 48 hours. Before SSMA, cash 
balances of operations from one given week (Monday to Friday) were cleared on 
next week Friday. The settlement period is T + 10, and before SSMA was T +30. In 
April 1993 the CNMV opened its new Servicio de Compensacion y Liquidacion 
(SCVL), the securities settlement and clearing service aimed at expediting the 
settlement period. The new system initially reduces the settlement period in Spain 
from T + 10 and in some cases T + 15 to T +7; later in 1994 the exchange believes this 
period will be reduced further to T +5. 
To give one reference of CATS evolution, it started on April 1989 and on May 1990, 
securities listed on CATS represented almost 90% of the total market value of Madrid 
Stock Exchange. 
3. The Data 
In this paper we use a sample of 37 stocks, which are both the most frequently traded 
at Madrid2 and the most important of each sector. These stocks are representative of 
the nine sectorial divisions (Foodstuffs, Banks, Communications, Construction, 
Utilities, Investment Funds, Chemicals, Iron & Steel and Others) and account for 
almost 60% of Trading Volume at Madrid. 
The sample are daily returns from January, I 1988 to July 30, 19903, so there are 638 
data points for each firm. There are from 350 to 450 data (depending on the date of 
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first listing in CATS) before the securities were listed in CATS and from 300 to 200 
after the listing. Table 1 summarizes number of firms in each sector, sectorial market 
value and weight in the IGBM. 
Table 1 
SECTOR FIRMS SECTORM.V. IGBMWEIGHT 
Foodstuffs 3 44.1% 2.3% 
Banks 4 55.1 17.0 
Communication 2 90.1 7.7 
Construction 6 50.2 6.9 
Electric U. 6 88.7 13.1 
Investment 2 40.3 2.3 
Chemical 5 34.5 3.8 
Iron & Steel 8 40.5 2.4 
Various 45.2 1.7 
This sample has been chosen to minimize possible influences from the October 1987 
meltdown, and from the Gulf crisis at the beginning of August 1990. However we 
could not avoid possible effects from the "mini-crash" of October 1989. 
As a "market" factor we use the Madrid Stock Exchange's general Index (1GB M). It 
is made up each year of 70-90 companies and represents about 80-85 % of the total 
capitalization of the market, excluding foreign stocks. It accounts for dividends and 
stock splits, and is a market value weighted index. Therefore it should reflect mainly 
the behavior of the big firms. 
4. Methodology 
Our target is to study if the Reform affected systematic risk measures and 
autocorrelations in returns. We define returns as the natumllogarithms of price relatives 
adjusted for dividends and splits. We assume that the "true" return rjl for security j in 
time t is generated by the market model 
r. = a.+BR + e. 
J,t J J t .J.l 
(1) 
where RI is the market index "true" return. We also assume that due to frictions in the 
trading process some kind of price-adjustment delay happens. Thus we obtain a series 
of observed returns for security j in time t, r. which are related to true returns as 
Jt 
follows: 
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N 
r~ = ~ <P . r. (2) J,t J,t-n,n J,t-n,n 
n=O 
where F are independent random variables both between true returns and between 
securities. In equation (2), F.
t
_ is the proportion of the true return r.
t
• generated in J. n.n J. n 
time t-n included n periods later in the observed return in time t. If there are no 
delays, F. is zero for any positive n and one for n=O. Different assumptions about J.t·n,n 
possible values for the realization of random variable F, and time delay n provides 
different models for the adjustment process. Scholes and Williams (1977), fixed n = 
I, and Cohen et al. (1983) extended their analysis to 0 > 1. In essence, the idea is that 
observed returns are computed as linear combinations of true returns with fixed (and 
known) lags (0) and parameters (F. ) The model is further extended by Lo and J.t-n,n 
MacKinlay (1990) which allow for any lag n and random parameters. 
Our first target is the estimation of measures of systematic risk in our data before and 
after the reforms. We use the market model (1). However, for the observed returns, 
the "observed" market model is 
o ° aORo ° (3) 
rj,t = a j +Pj t +cj,t 
It is well known that OLS estimators of beta are biased and inconsistent is there are 
delays in price adjustments. To cope with these problems we estimate the betas using 
the Scholes and Williams (1977) (SW) and Cohen et al.(1983a) (CHMSW) estimators 
The SW method uses a variate of the observed market model 
o ° aO R ° rj,t = aj +Pj,k t+k +cj,t k=-l,O,l (4) 
and the consistent estimator of systematic risk is 
, 
~j= IbJ,k / (1+2p,) (5) 
k=-' 
where b J,k are OLS estimators and p, is the (observed) first order autocorrelation 
coefficient of market index returns. 
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Another consistent estimator of true beta can be found using the CHMSW method 
which allows for more than one day in price adjustments (i.e. n > 1). The estimator is 
N N N 
~j=(bf+ Lb~+n + Lb~.n)/ (l+2LPn) (6) 
n=l n=l n=l 
Estimated residual first order autocorrelation from (3) are then analyzed, before and 
after reforms using OLS, SW and CHMSW estimators. 
5. Results 
Table 2 present OLS betas and first order residual autocorrelations for total sample 
and before and after CATS4 • Standard errors are computed using heteroscedastic-
consistent procedures, see White (1980). Overall, systematic risk are lower after CATS 
and autocorrelations are lower and nonsignificant. However the Banks sector behaves 
differently. Their betas increase and their autocorrelations are lower than before CATS 
but still significant. Also in agreement with results in Urrutia (1990) residual volatility 
is lower after CATS. 
To take into account price-adjustment delays and other possible frictions we reestimate 
all models using SW and CHMSWs estimators, which are displayed in Tables 3 and 
4. As results are similar, we summarize them jointly. Before CATS, betas tend to be 
lower than OLS estimators but there are no clear cut differences with them, but with 
two exceptions. The Banks sector estimators are much higher (i.e. systematic risk 
could be greater than the OLS betas) and Communications sector betas are lower. 
After CATS, OLS, SW and CHMSW estimators are in close agreement, suggesting 
that price adjustments are faster than before. 
Residual autocorrelations are pretty similar as were with OLS estimators, a result not 
very surprising given the results in Brown and Warner (1985). Before CATS some 
sectors present significant first order autocorrelations, specially Banks and 
Communications. After CATS, only Banks remain with significant figures, which 
suggests less frictions in the price formation process. 
5.1 A Comment on Why Banks are Different 
It can be argued that before CATS, trading systems are one relevant factor for the 
peculiar Banks sector behavior. The usual trading system for an non-Banks stocks 
before CATS where a verbal can auction ("a la criee"). But Banks were traded on a 
written order entry system ("par cassiers"). The system was as follows: trading orders 
are accumulated in an order "book". If supply and demand do not exactly balance, 
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one clearing price is set which maximizes trading volume. Therefore if one order is 
of high volume enough, it can influence the final "equilibrium" price. 
The work by Berges and Soria (1992) suggests that Banks used to "care" about the 
pricing of their own stock, directly or through participated firms, using tactics like 
using "stoppers" (i.e. high volume orders) to keep prices around desired targets. These 
strategies, if permanently applied, could help to explain the two basic features that 
distinguish the Banks sector from others. First, repeated interventions of this kind 
could create dependence in price changes. Second, relationship with market evolution 
should be weaker. That is exactly the kind of features we find in the Banks sector. 
Strong first order autocorrelation, which suggests an almost daily interventions and 
then, low betas that when corrected for price delays increased significantly. After the 
reform, OLS betas and adjusted betas are similar, and autocorrelations decreased, 
suggesting that CATS prevents to some extent these intervention tactics. 
6. Conclusions 
Some microstructure consequences of the Spanish Stock Exchange Reform on 
measures of systematic risk and autocorrelations of daily asset returns are studied. 
Using a sample of selected stocks we find after the Reform significant decreases in 
autocorrelations. The Banks sector shows some special features, which are explained 
in terms of the trading mechanism. Results suggests that some kind of price intervention 
was not uncommon before CATS. After CATS the evidence is much weaker, suggesting 
that the Reform had increased market's operational efficiency. 
Footnotes 
I The old trading system were based on daily auctions developed at fixed time intervals, 
and with only three hours of total trading time (from lOAM to 1 PM). 
2 There are about 400 securities listed in the Madrid Stock Exchange, but only 80 are 
actively traded. We consider only securities not affected by takeovers or other 
disturbing events. Given these restrictions we tried to choose a representative enough 
sample. 
3 The reader interested in details of the construction of the return series and corrections 
for dividends, stock splits, and other effects should consult Urrutia (1990). 
4 Only results for sectors are presented, which are equally weighted portfolios of 
individual securities. We also performed the analysis with market value weighted 
portfolios and results were very similar. These results and the ones for individual 
stocks are available on request. 
S CHMSW estimators for values ofn = 2, 3, 4, 5 were computed (available on request). 
Figures in Table 4 are for n = 5. The differences between them are small due to low 
autocorrelations in the index market returns. 
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Table 2. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FOOD 1.31 1.48 0.92 0.03 0.18 0.08 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.24) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) 
BANK 0.78 0.64 1.27 0.34 0.37 0.25 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.15) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
COMM 1.08 1.24 0.57 -0.15 -0.18 0.11 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
CONS 1.67 1.77 1.44 0.10 0.13 0.08 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) 
ELEC 1.16 1.28 0.96 0.05 0.12 0.09 
(0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
INVS 0.84 1.03 0.50 0.04 0.11 0.03 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) 
CHEM 1.63 1.73 1.44 0.03 0.06 0.02 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
IRON 1.68 2.03 1.09 0.06 0.08 -0.02 
(0.11) (0.21) (0.15) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
OTHR 1.54 1.61 1.46 0.08 0.16 -0.03 
(0.10) (0.17) (0.16) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
ALL 1.34 1.48 1.10 0.08 0.10 0.06 
STOCKS (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.03) (0.04) (007) 
(7) 0.0165 0.0181 0.0158 0.0152 0.0168 0.0144 
(1) OLS Beta total sample (2) OLS Beta before CATS (3) OLS Beta after CATS 
(4) First order residual autocorrelation total sample (5) First order residual 
autocorrelation before CATS (6) First order residual autocorrelation after CATS 
(7) Residual standard error (total portfolio) 
Numbers in brackets are heteroscedastic-consistent asymptotic standard errors (White's 
covariance matrix). 
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Table 3. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FOOD 1.26 1.43 0.96 0.04 0.17 0.07 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.21) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
BANK 1.03 0.90 1.32 0.30 0.34 0.23 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
COMM 0.77 0.86 0.52 -0.13 -0.17 0.11 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
CONS 1.65 1.73 1.40 0.10 0.13 0.08 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) 
ELEC 1.02 1.10 0.85 0.04 0.11 0.08 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
INVS 0.79 1.05 0.42 0.04 0.11 0.03 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) 
CHEM 1.46 1.54 1.33 0.03 0.06 0.02 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
IRON 1.66 1.96 1.14 0.06 0.08 -0.02 
(0.09) (0.18) (O.ll) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
OTHR 1.62 1.85 1.36 0.08 0.17 -0.03 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.13) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
ALL 1.25 1.38 1.03 0.07 0.09 0.05 
STOCKS (0.05) (0.10) (0.12) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
(7) 0.0163 0.0196 0.0158 0.0152 0.0171 0.0146 
(1) SW Beta total sample (2) SW Beta before CATS (3) SW Beta after CATS 
(4) First order residual autocorrelation total sample (5) First order residual 
autocorrelation before CATS (6) First order residual autocorrelation after CATS 
(7) Residual standard error (total portfolio) 
Numbers in brackets below Betas are asymptotic standard errors (Scholes and Wi11iams 
(1977) equation 26» and below autocorrelation estimators are heteroscedastic-
consistent asymptotic standard errors (White's covariance matrix). 
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Table 4. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FOOD 1.20 1.39 1.06 0.04 0.17 0.07 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
BANK LlO 0.94 1.34 0.30 0.34 0.23 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
COMM 0.71 0.80 0.51 -0.13 -0.17 0.11 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
CONS 1.64 1.71 1.38 0.10 0.13 0.08 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.07) 
ELEC 0.97 1.02 0.81 0.04 0.11 0.08 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
INVS 0.72 1.04 0.51 0.04 O.ll 0.03 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.06) 
CHEM 1.36 1.52 1.23 0.03 0.06 0.02 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
IRON 1.56 1.90 1.15 0.06 0.08 -0.02 
(0.03) (004) (0.07) 
OTHR 1.64 1.83 1.31 0.08 0.17 -0.03 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
ALL 1.21 1.18 .98 0.07 0.09 0.05 
STOCKS (0.03) (004) (007) 
(1) CHMSW Beta total sample (2) CHMSW Beta before CATS (3) CHMSW Beta 
after CATS (4) First order residual autocorrelation total sample (5) First order residual 
autocorrelation before CATS (6) First order residual autocorrelation after CATS 
Numbers below autocorrelation estimators are heteroscedastic-consistent asymptotic 
standard errors (White's covariance matrix). 
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